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Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War epub

by Margaret MacMillan


Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War epub

ISBN: 0719562333

ISBN13: 978-0719562334

Author: Margaret MacMillan

Category: History

Subcategory: Europe

Language: English

Publisher: John Murray General Publishing Division (June 24, 2002)

Pages: 538 pages

ePUB book: 1951 kb

FB2 book: 1634 kb

Rating: 4.9

Votes: 461

Other Formats: doc docx lrf txt





Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (2001) is a historical narrative about the events of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (2001) is a historical narrative about the events of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It was written by the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan with a foreword by American diplomat Richard Holbrooke. The book has also been published under the titles Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World and Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World.

The story of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, when for six extraordinary months the city was at the centre of world government as the peacemakers wound up bankrupt empires and created new countries

The story of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, when for six extraordinary months the city was at the centre of world government as the peacemakers wound up bankrupt empires and created new countries. This book brings to life the personalities, ideals and prejudices of the settlement brokers. See all Product description.

The Peace Conference was the world’s most important business, the peacemakers its most powerful people

The Peace Conference was the world’s most important business, the peacemakers its most powerful people. They met day after day. They argued, debated, quarreled and made it up again. They created new countries and new organizations. They dined together and went to the theater together, and between January and June, Paris was at once the world’s government, its court of appeal and its parliament, the focus of its fears and hopes.

Peacemakers: the paris conference of 1919 and its attempt to end wa. How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War. Margaret MacMillan. First published in Great Britain in 2013 by.

Peacemakers: the paris conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war. Uses and abuses of history. Extraordinary canadians: stephen leacock. The war that ended peace. Profile books ltd. 3A Exmouth House.

The book has also been published under the titles Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World and Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World. Margaret Olwen MacMillan is a Canadian historian and professor at the University of Oxford. She is former provost of Trinity College and professor of history at the University of Toronto and previously at Ryerson University.

Introduction The Paris Peace Conference came at the end of the worst war Europeans had ever seen. More than twenty-million men had been killed on the battlefields. Modern war had not yet begun to kill civilians in large numbers. Russia had collapsed into revolution and civil war and there were fears that anarchy would spread through Europe and the world. We will look at the circumstances in which the peacemakers met in Paris, the many issues.

The book has also been published under the titles Paris 1919: Six Months . The book argues that the conditions imposed on Germany in the Treaty o. . Peacemakers describes the six months of negotiations that took place in Woodrow Wilson of the United States. The book argues that the conditions imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles did not lead to the rise of Adolf Hitler, asking the question: Was the Great War "an unmitigated catastrophe in a sea of mud", or "about something", and concluding "It is condescending and wrong to think they were hoodwinked. British WWI Prime Minister. History books about World War I.

It was written by the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan with a foreword by American diplomat Richard Holbrooke.

jpg Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (2001) is a historical narrative about the events of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

March 23 2003, 12:00am, The Sunday Times

March 23 2003, 12:00am, The Sunday Times. MacMillan uses the six extraordinary months of idealism, colonial venality, confusion, vengefulness, pragmatism and good old-fashioned horse-trading that led to the Versailles treaty of June 1919 as the basis for a tremendous story about the intersection of personality and public expectation in politics, and problems of nationality that remain unsolved. She believes that the peacemakers faced an impossible task, and that they were continually hamstrung by the lack of political will to enforce the difficult decisions they had to make.

Between January and July 1919, after the war to end all wars, men and . For six extraordinary months the city was effectively the centre of world government as the peacemakers wound up bankrupt empires and created new countries

Between January and July 1919, after the war to end all wars, men and women from all over the world converged on Paris for the Peace Conference. At its heart were the leaders of the three great powers - Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau. For six extraordinary months the city was effectively the centre of world government as the peacemakers wound up bankrupt empires and created new countries. They pushed Russia to the sidelines, alienated China and dismissed the Arabs, struggled with the problems of Kosovo, of the Kurds, and of a homeland for the Jews.

Detailed and a lot of information, but I thought it needed a conclusion with the impact that those decisions that were made in 1918 have had subsequenty.
extraordinary book, a revelation in many ways, worth every bit of time and money
This was a fast transaction and the book was in great shape.
I recommend this vender to shppers and would use again without reservation.
A brilliant and entertaining account of the Peace Conference, the main actors, and the issues. Hard to put down. The companion book, the Road to War is just as good.
Fast delivery. Product as described. Thank you.
"Peacemakers" by the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan describes the six months of negotiations that took place in Paris. She does so mainly from the perspective of the main actors involved. The "Big Four" David Lloyd George (Britain), Vittorio Orlando (Italy), Georges Clemenceau (France), and last but not least Woodrow Wilson (United States) met informally 145 times and made all the major decisions, which in turn were ratified by the others.

The book is based on thorough research and painstaking archival work, yet is lively and entertaining to read. As a great-granddaughter of Lloyd George, she tends to favour her famous ancestor to some degree but admits that his knowledge had great gaps (her geography is sometimes a bit fuzzy as well).

However, I strongly oppose the validity of her conclusion that the conditions imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles would not have prevented the rise of Adolf Hitler. It is true, in hindsight the terms of the 1919 Peace Treaty do not appear that harsh. But she completely ignores the psychological impact of (some of) these on public opinion in Germany. Especially, article 231, often known as the War Guilt Clause, became a major theme of Adolf Hitler's political career. His struggle against the "Shame of Versailles" and for the rebuilding of German military power, the recovery of the lost eastern provinces, and last but not least the restoration of German pride fostered his rise to power.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 ended the Napoleonic Wars in a way that was generally acceptable to all the major powers in Europe, even the defeated France. It established a general peace on the continent for some 50 or - if you will - some 100 years. In 1919 there were no negotiations with the defeated nations - they were only allowed to comment on the terms the victors had agreed on. After the Treaty of Versailles Marshal Ferdinand Foch said "This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years". And so it came to pass: on September 1st, 1939 the world witnessed the beginnings of yet another World War that reached near apocalyptic levels.
A superb and very readable account of the policies and personalities of those who concocted the peace settlement at the end of the First World War. The general story will be known to most who have an interest in the period, but here we have details that will be known to only a few. The pen portraits of Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau are excellent and flesh out the picture that many readers will already have of them, but so are those of participants the names of whom figure in few text-books, like Billy Hughes, the coarse prime minister of Australia, or Prince Saionji and Baron Makino of the Japanese delegation, to mention just a few. And there is a wonderful set piece near the end about the closing scenes at Versailles.

The negotiations and the differences between the peace makers are set out in lucid detail, together with the nicely ironic comment, often as asides in brackets. The author pilots us skilfully through the complications of the Balkans, and only the treatment of the admittedly tortuous developments in Syria and Mesopotamia (Iraq) are a little on the stodgy side. There are model succinct summaries of the past history of the areas under discussion, and equally succinct ones of what happened to them after the peace treaties, right up to the present day.

As at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, there is constant mistrust among the peace makers: France did not want a strong Italy; Britain (looking back to the rivalry before the Entente of 1904) distrusted France; Italy constantly tried to thwart the new Yugoslavia and was in competition with Greece. It should be no surprise to any student of politics that double standards were constantly in evidence: statesmen who had got what they wanted described the demands of others as `greedy' (except, unfortunately, for Lloyd George who was bewitched by Venizelos of Greece, possibly the greediest of the lot). There was the sordid haggling over the allocation of reparation payments from Germany, with contempt being shown to little Belgium's claim for a fair share of them. The high-minded and high-handed Wilson simply overruled the majority vote in one of the commissions that the Covenant of the League should include a racial equality clause proposed by the Japanese. He then compensated the Japanese with another betrayal of his own principles by accepting the Japanese claim on Chinese Shantung.

Macmillan is particularly illuminating on the Japanese. They were initially included in the Supreme Council which made all the decisions, but were then simply dropped. The service chiefs in Britain and the United States were already contemplating that one day they would have to go to war with Japan - not altogether surprising, since Japan was clearly already set on expansion.

But the Supreme Council often gave only cursory attention to areas outside of Europe, and did not listen carefully to what experts could tell them. This accounts to a large extent to the shambles they made in the Middle East. The consequences, as far as the Arabs were concerned, took some time to show themselves; but the stupidity of the peace makers' dealings with Turkey proper were quickly exposed by the success of Kemal Ataturk, who swiftly destroyed the Treaty of Sèvres which had been imposed on the Sultan.

Only Clemenceau wanted the League of Nations to have `teeth': he saw it first and foremost as an organization to prevent future German aggression. The other members of the Supreme Council were not prepared to sacrifice any of their sovereignty; and even President Wilson, for whom the League was of greater importance than anything else, knew that Congress would never stand for giving the League real power and did not press for it.

Macmillan concludes that Germany was actually better placed after the Versailles Settlement than it had been in 1914: Poland was now a barrier against Russia, and in the South East there were only small states instead of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This is presumably what Andrew Roberts had in mind when he commended the book as `splendidly revisionist and daringly politically incorrect'. Splendid though this book is, I can see only one other sentence, on p. 476, that would merit that description, and it is one of only two sentences in the book with which I disagree: if you read article 231, you can hardly say, as she does, that this has been inaccurately described as `the war guilt clause'.

My other disagreement is that the Sykes-Picot Agreement had not promised Palestine to the French (p.427): only the Upper Galilee. The rest was to be under joint British-French-Russian protection.

I cannot fully agree with the author's conclusion, which might perhaps be called revisionist. So many parts of the Peace Settlement left time-bombs, many of which detonated in the Nazi period and some of which (Kosovo, Iraq, Israel-Palestine) are still detonating today. Some of the advice which the peace makers received, but ignored, warned them of the dangers. But Macmillan thinks that the main responsibility for allowing them to detonate lies with the decisions taken or not taken by the next generation, not with the peace makers: `They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors.'

These very few criticisms aside, I have nothing but praise for this fine achievement.